HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019533.jpg
1.66 MB
Extraction Summary
3
People
7
Organizations
3
Locations
3
Events
2
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Book excerpt / government exhibit
File Size:
1.66 MB
Summary
This document appears to be page 45 from a book (identified by the filename 'Epst_9780451494566' as Edward Jay Epstein's *How America Lost Its Secrets*) stamped as a House Oversight exhibit. The text details how Edward Snowden exploited a lack of auditing software at the NSA's Kunia base in Hawaii to steal classified data while working for Dell in 2012. It explains that post-9/11 reforms to eliminate 'stovepiping' created a shared network (NSANet) that allowed system administrators like Snowden access to CIA and Defense Department documents without detection.
People (3)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Snowden | System Administrator / Contractor |
Stole classified data from the NSA while working for Dell; exploited a lack of auditing software at the Kunia base.
|
| Ledgett | NSA Official (implied) |
Reported on the NSA analysis of the 58,000 documents given by Snowden to journalists.
|
| Michael Hayden | Former NSA Director |
Described NSANet access points to the author as equivalent to 'reading rooms' in a library.
|
Organizations (7)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| NSA |
National Security Agency; victim of data theft.
|
|
| Dell |
Company Snowden worked for in 2012 while stealing documents.
|
|
| Wired |
Magazine where Snowden gave an interview regarding the lack of audit mechanisms.
|
|
| 9/11 Commission |
Concluded that intelligence failures were due to inability to 'connect the dots,' leading to changes in network archi...
|
|
| CIA |
Documents from this agency were included in the NSANet.
|
|
| Defense Department |
Documents from this department were included in the NSANet.
|
|
| House Oversight Committee |
Source of the document stamp (HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019533).
|
Locations (3)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
NSA headquarters where auditing software was installed.
|
|
|
Location of regional NSA facilities.
|
|
|
Specific NSA base in Hawaii that lacked real-time file transfer monitoring.
|
Relationships (2)
described them to me
Key Quotes (4)
"This security gap allowed Snowden, using his system administrator's credentials, to copy classified data to a thumb drive without anyone's being able to trace the copied data back to him."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019533.jpg
Quote #1
"Prior to the 9/11 attacks in 2001, 'stovepiping' had protected NSA data on its computers from networks used by other intelligence services."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019533.jpg
Quote #2
"NSANet... became a shared network with 'common access points,' as the former NSA director Michael Hayden described them to me, which made them the equivalent of 'reading rooms' in a library."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019533.jpg
Quote #3
"If a system administrator copied data from this network, no one knew."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019533.jpg
Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,449 characters)
Crossing the Rubicon | 45
which was done at NSA headquarters in Fort Meade and most of the
NSA's regional facilities, had not yet been installed at the Hawaii
base, because a lack of bandwidth prevented the safe upgrading of
the software. This auditing software was scheduled to be installed
after the backup system was completed in 2013. The Kunia base was
one of the last NSA bases that did not monitor suspicious transfers
of files on a real-time basis. Snowden was aware of this deficiency;
he later pointed out in his interview in Wired that the NSA base
where he worked did not have an "audit" mechanism. This security
gap allowed Snowden, using his system administrator's credentials,
to copy classified data to a thumb drive without anyone's being able
to trace the copied data back to him. According to the NSA's subse-
quent damage assessment, he stole many thousands of pages while
working for Dell in 2012 before he contacted journalists. Ledgett
subsequently reported that the NSA analysis of the fifty-eight thou-
sand documents that were given by Snowden to journalists in June
2013 showed that most of them were taken while he was still work-
ing at Dell.
NSA's regional facilities, had not yet been installed at the Hawaii
base, because a lack of bandwidth prevented the safe upgrading of
the software. This auditing software was scheduled to be installed
after the backup system was completed in 2013. The Kunia base was
one of the last NSA bases that did not monitor suspicious transfers
of files on a real-time basis. Snowden was aware of this deficiency;
he later pointed out in his interview in Wired that the NSA base
where he worked did not have an "audit" mechanism. This security
gap allowed Snowden, using his system administrator's credentials,
to copy classified data to a thumb drive without anyone's being able
to trace the copied data back to him. According to the NSA's subse-
quent damage assessment, he stole many thousands of pages while
working for Dell in 2012 before he contacted journalists. Ledgett
subsequently reported that the NSA analysis of the fifty-eight thou-
sand documents that were given by Snowden to journalists in June
2013 showed that most of them were taken while he was still work-
ing at Dell.
This theft was made even more serious by the interconnection
of NSA computers with those of other intelligence agencies. Prior
to the 9/11 attacks in 2001, "stovepiping" had protected NSA data
on its computers from networks used by other intelligence services.
After the 9/11 Commission concluded that part of the reason U.S.
intelligence agencies were unable to "connect the dots" in advance of
the attack was related to this practice, the NSA stripped away a large
part of its stovepiping. As a result, the NSANet, which Snowden
had access to at Dell in 2012, became a shared network with "com-
mon access points," as the former NSA director Michael Hayden
described them to me, which made them the equivalent of "reading
rooms" in a library. They served as a means for NSA workers to
exchange ideas about the problems they were encountering on vari-
ous projects for the intelligence community. In maintaining them,
system administrators, or "system admins," like Snowden, acted as
the "librarians." If a system administrator copied data from this net-
work, no one knew.
of NSA computers with those of other intelligence agencies. Prior
to the 9/11 attacks in 2001, "stovepiping" had protected NSA data
on its computers from networks used by other intelligence services.
After the 9/11 Commission concluded that part of the reason U.S.
intelligence agencies were unable to "connect the dots" in advance of
the attack was related to this practice, the NSA stripped away a large
part of its stovepiping. As a result, the NSANet, which Snowden
had access to at Dell in 2012, became a shared network with "com-
mon access points," as the former NSA director Michael Hayden
described them to me, which made them the equivalent of "reading
rooms" in a library. They served as a means for NSA workers to
exchange ideas about the problems they were encountering on vari-
ous projects for the intelligence community. In maintaining them,
system administrators, or "system admins," like Snowden, acted as
the "librarians." If a system administrator copied data from this net-
work, no one knew.
For Snowden, the NSANet, which included CIA and Defense
Department documents, provided a rich hunting ground in the fall
Department documents, provided a rich hunting ground in the fall
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 45 9/29/16 5:51 PM
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019533
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019533
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