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Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page61 of 93

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definition of an “aggravated felony” under federal im-
migration law, Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478
(2012); Leocal, 543 U.S. at 7, a context in which the
categorical approach traditionally applies because the
inquiry is whether the alien’s prior conviction meets
the definition. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 59. And United
States v. Morgan, 393 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2004), is like-
wise distinguishable, as it “involved a venue statute
presenting significantly different concerns” than those
present here. (A.148).

Maxwell also relies on a trio of cases, chief among
them Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953).
(Br.45-47). In Bridges, the Supreme Court “applied an
‘essential ingredient’ test to determine whether an of-
fense qualified for a provision . . . that extended the
criminal limitations period for certain fraud offenses.”
Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 59 n.10. But as this Court has
explained, “Bridges is distinguishable” because the Su-
preme Court “there believed applying the restrictive
‘essential ingredient’ test to determine if an offense ‘in-
volv[ed] the defrauding of the United States’ effectu-
ated Congress’s specific intent to limit the . . . extended
limitations period to only a few offenses,” while “Con-
gress had the opposite intention for § 3283.” Id. The
other two cases, United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S.
518 (1932), and United States v. Noveck, 271 U.S. 201
(1926), are distinguishable on similar grounds. In any
event, the “essential ingredient” test does not help
Maxwell. As discussed above, an “offense involving the
sexual . . . abuse . . . of a child,” 18 U.S.C. § 3283, must
be read in light of the definition of “sexual abuse” set
forth in Section 3509(a), which encompasses a wide
range of conduct that is not limited to actual sexual

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